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Abstract: 
Financial markets are to a very large extent influenced by the advent of information. Such 
disclosures, however, do not only contain information about fundamentals underlying the 
markets, but they also serve as a focal point for the beliefs of market participants. This dual 
role of information gains further importance for explaining the development of asset valua-
tions when taking into account that information may be perceived individually (private infor-
mation), or may be commonly shared by all traders (public information). This study investi-
gates into the recently developed theoretical structures explaining the operating mechanism of 
the two types of information and emphasizes the empirical testability and differentiation be-
tween the role of private and public information. Concluding from a survey of experimental 
studies and own econometric analyses, it is argued that most often public information domi-
nates private information. This finding justifies central bankers’ unease when disseminating 
news to the markets and argues against the recent trend of demanding full transparency both 
for financial institutions and financial markets themselves. 
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Observing the development of financial markets over the last decades strengthens the view that 
movements in prices and valuations of financial aggregates are to a very large extent influenced by the 
advent of information. This observation is only partly explained by the fact that such disclosures 
contain information about economic and financial fundamentals underlying the assets. But information 
plays an even more important role for financial markets. It also serves as a focal point for the beliefs of 
market participants (Morris and Shin, 2002a). Since the behaviour of market participants is often 
characterised by strategic complementarities, i.e. it is the more rewarding to choose a specific action 
(for instance to buy an asset), the larger the number of others is that also choose this action, traders 
typically find themselves in decision problems similar to coordination games. In such instances, each 
market participant’s best choice of action depends strongly on what other traders decide to do, and one 
indicator of others’ behaviour is the information available to them.  
 
With regard to this explanation, it is reasonable to differentiate between two categories of information: 
private and public. Whereas private information refers to pieces of knowledge that may be different 
from one trader to the next, public information is commonly shared by all traders. What is more, 
public information is characterised by the fact that everyone knows that everyone shares this 
information, that everyone knows that everyone knows that everyone shares this information and so 
forth until it becomes common knowledge. Bearing in mind the dual role of information – on the one 
hand informing about fundamental facts, on the other hand coordinating traders’ beliefs –  the question 
arises whether it is possible to determine which type of information, the private or the public one, is 
more strongly responsible for the behaviour of market participants and hence for the swings in asset 
prices. Whereas this question has been tackled in various theoretical analyses for the last two decades, 
only recently have empirical studies made an attempt to give an answer and derive policy implications 
for an optimal information setting on financial markets. This paper aims at giving a comprehensive 
view particularly on the empirical testability and differentiation between the role of private and public 
information. In order to find potential evidence of one of the two types of information dominating the 
other, we will also briefly cover the theoretical work underlying the analysis of information on 
financial markets. 
 
Early theoretical studies on the role of information in financial markets concentrated on private 
information solely. Some analyses interpreted private information as insider information and examined 
the informed traders’ impact on the market development (Kyle, 1985; Glosten and  Milgrom, 1985). 
Generally, it has been concluded that insiders profit from acting based on their (private) information, 
possibly even to such an extent that uninformed traders are no longer willing to engage in trade with 
them (Bhattacharya and Spiegel, 1991). Apart from very few exceptions (Holden and Subrahmanyam, 
1992), these early market microstructure studies did not take into account any strategic interplay 
between informed traders. Hence, the dual role of information was not regarded. 
 
Renewed research interest in financial market crises following financial turmoil in Europe, Latin 
America and Asia during the 1990s led to a recent strand of literature analysing the role of information 
in a more complex framework. Since traders’ behaviour in financial crises displays a strong element of   3
strategic complementarity, the dual role of information is particularly obvious. Whereas earlier studies 
on financial crises assumed that market participants publicly observe economic fundamentals without 
error (Obstfeld, 1994, 1996), the model by Morris and Shin (1998) restricted fundamental information 
to be private rather than public. Moreover information was assumed to be slightly flawed. It was 
argued that economic data is usually made available from different sources with a time lag, often 
preliminarily with some data still missing, and subject to later revisions. Hence, traders cannot 
perceive these pieces of information to be fully reliable and will use earlier experience and possibly 
also additional information unrelated to the respective market to form individual expectations with 
regard to economic fundamentals. In other words, information is private rather than public, and 
moreover incomplete.  
 
Based on such an informational structure underlying financial markets, Morris and Shin (1998, 2001) 
showed that coordinated behaviour by market participants leads to a financial crisis whenever the 
underlying fundamental state is sufficiently bad. In contrast, the model by Obstfeld (1994, 1996) lead 
to the unsatisfactory result, that, taking the example of a currency crisis, the event of a speculative 
attack is only one of several possible equilibria. Due to the assumption of complete and common 
information about economic fundamentals, an interval arises in these models where fundamentals are 
neither so good that all traders rationally abstain from attacking, nor so bad that all market participants 
join a speculative attack. The outcome is then determined by self-fulfilling beliefs: if a single trader 
believes his opponents to attack the currency, he will also decide to attack. Hence, the speculative 
mass on the market becomes so high that indeed the attack is successful, which fulfils the initial 
beliefs. The same holds if a trader thinks that other traders will not attack and concludes that it would 
be best for him not to attack either. Again, this decision ends in a self-fulfilling prophecy. The 
differing result derived by Morris and Shin stems from the fact that traders, relying on their imprecise 
private information, can no longer be sure about the knowledge of their opponents. Even if an 
individual speculator is perfectly convinced by his private information that the currency is in the stable 
region of fundamentals, he cannot be sure that his opponents know the same. This uncertainty 
influences the decision of whether or not to attack up to a point, where the trader, after obtaining his 
private information, is indifferent between attacking and not attacking the currency peg. For all private 
information signalling that the fundamental state of the economy is worse than this indifference point, 
the agent will attack, but will refrain from doing so for all private signals that are better than this 
threshold.  
 
Later research, sparked off by the insightful results of the Morris and Shin model, analysed the aspects 
of information more closely. In order to categorise the different approaches, the following notation 
might be helpful. Whenever market participants try to coordinate their decisions and have to rely on 
potentially incomplete, i.e. not fully precise, information, two types of uncertainty may arise. First, 
there is uncertainty about the fundamentals underlying the assets in the respective financial market. 
Second, traders are also unsure about their opponents’ behaviour. This latter type is referred to as 
behavioural uncertainty (Morris and Shin, 2002a). Game theory relying on Nash equilibria typically 
assumes away this type of uncertainty (Hirshleifer and Riley, 1992). Whereas the model by Obstfeld 
(1994, 1996) includes neither fundamental nor behavioural uncertainty due to the assumption of 
complete and common information, the model by Morris and Shin (1998) takes into account both 
types of uncertainty, as can be seen from the following table.  
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Tab.1: 
 
Fundamental Certainty  Fundamental Uncertainty 
Behavioural Certainty  Obstfeld (1994,1996)  Sbracia and Zaghini (2001) 
 
Behavioural Uncertainty 
 
Heinemann and Illing (2002) 
Morris and Shin (1998) 
Metz (2002, 2003a) 
Heinemann and Metz (2002) 
 
 
A study by Sbracia and Zaghini (2001) analyses the case where information about fundamentals is 
public, but not completely precise, so that uncertainty about traders’ behaviour is resolved, since all 
traders possess the same ‘common’ information, while fundamental uncertainty still prevails. Such 
situation might be interpreted as market participants holding the same view on publicly disseminated 
information. Everyone knows that the information they are provided with, for instance by the central 
bank, the government, or simply the media, might be faulty, but everyone interprets the available 
information in the same way. Hence, all market participants share the same opinion with regard to the 
fundamentals underlying the market without fully knowing their true value. As Sbracia and Zaghini 
prove, the fact that the information sets of the market participants are equivalent is sufficient to re-
introduce multiplicity of equilibria. Furthermore, even slight changes in traders’ beliefs can – in a 
currency crisis setting as one example - lead to a coordinated attack on the currency peg in a region of 
fundamentals, where the peg would have been stable if information had been private rather than 
public. In particular, they show that less precise public information may increase the likelihood of a 
speculative attack by broadening the interval of economic fundamentals where a crisis is inevitable. 
 
The study by Heinemann and Illing (2002) is one of the few that covers behavioural uncertainty while 
disposing of fundamental uncertainty in financial market decisions. Proceeding from the currency 
crisis model by Morris and Shin (1998), Heinemann and Illing examine the consequences of 
completely precise private information. In contrast to Sbracia and Zaghini, their model allows for 
individual beliefs about the fundamental state, while at the same time assuming that private 
information is very close to the actual economic state, i.e. private information is infinitely precise. 
Even though the traders’ information sets become very similar the more precise private information is, 
beliefs are not shared. As a result, the model does not display multiple equilibria, but renders a unique 
threshold dividing the range of fundamentals into an attack-interval and an interval where the fixed 
parity is stable. Heinemann and Illing then prove that a decrease in the noisiness of private information 
reduces the probability of traders coordinating on a speculative attack. They conclude that increased 
transparency about economic fundamentals and about policy measures influencing the economic 
development is a necessary ingredient of a policy setting that aims at reducing the danger of 
speculative attacks. Transparency in this sense is defined as disseminating private information of 
maximum precision.  
 
However, it stands to reason whether it is always only one of the two types of uncertainty that prevails 
in the market. If that were the case, i.e. if uncertainty about the market participants’ behaviour would 
vanish whenever traders are uncertain about the development of economic and financial fundamentals, 
while fundamental uncertainty would be resolved whenever traders are unable to figure out their   5
opponents’ optimal actions, the theoretical results would advise the information providing authorities 
to disclose fundamentally relevant information with the highest possible level of precision to prevent 
inefficient speculative pressure on the price of an asset. This would mean, for instance, that economic 
data should be published as timely and accurately as possible, covering as many statistics as might be 
of interest to financial market participants. This plead for transparency has been supported by many 
institutions overseeing financial markets, among them the IMF. Referring to its Special Data 
Dissemination Standard (SDDS), the IMF states that “better transparency, in both economic policy 
and in data on economic and financial developments, can strengthen the markets’ ability to undertake 
appropriate credit risk assessment and so reduce the likelihood of crises and mitigate their severity 
when they do occur” (IMF, 1998).  
 
Yet, the argument in favour of increased transparency does not fully take into account the dual role of 
information, but relies merely on dissolving fundamental uncertainty. The dilemma of striking the 
optimal balance between resolving fundamental uncertainty while not giving rise to too strong an 
emphasis on coordination motives has been recognized in particular by policy makers at central banks. 
Fearing that market participants might overreact to - usually not completely precise -public 
information, they are very cautious when publicly communicating with financial markets. Recent 
research therefore argued that both private and public information influence the decisions of market 
participants so that fundamental as well as behavioural uncertainty prevails on financial markets.  
 
In order to give advice to policy makers searching for the optimal design of information policy, Metz 
(2002, 2003a) and Heinemann and Metz (2002) examined more closely the simultaneous interrelation 
of private and public information on foreign exchange markets and their influence on traders’ 
behaviour when characterized by strategic complementarities.
1 The studies found that the impact of 
the precision of information on traders’ behaviour is contingent on two factors. First, it depends on the 
so-called market sentiment, i.e. on the belief that is generally held by the market with regard to the 
underlying economic and financial fundamentals. The market sentiment is constituted as the 
aggregation of commonly shared information. Since in these models public information is assumed to 
be not completely precise, the market sentiment can be defined as the mean of the distribution of 
public information. Secondly, the influence of information precision depends on the type of 
information, private or public. The studies showed that increasing the precision of either public or 
private information nearly always has opposite effect on traders’ behaviour. Whenever the market 
sentiment is very pessimistic with regard to the economic development, increasing the precision of 
public information will raise the likelihood of a speculative attack while disseminating more precise 
private information will decrease it. In contrast, if the market is very optimistic concerning economic 
fundamentals, more precise public information will reduce the probability of a crisis while more 
precise private information will increase the likelihood of a crisis.  
 
What is the underlying rationale for this rather complex result? Market participants in these models 
receive both private and public information, i.e. they partly share beliefs, since they all read the 
newspapers, listen to central bank announcements, etc. and - this is important - they know that all 
                                                 
1  With regard to the question of whether a unique equilibrium or multiple equilibria emerge from the 
coordination problem among traders, Morris and Shin (2002b) and  Hellwig (2002) found the precision ratio of 
private information relative to public information to be the determining factor. Only if private information is 
sufficiently precise, a unique equilibrium can be sustained and further statements can be made on the impact of 
information on financial markets.  
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others do this as well, but they also interpret this information individually. These private 
interpretations might be due to additional information gathered from earlier experience or observations 
from various other markets. Traders may now be inclined to give more weight to their individual 
interpretations, i.e. they perceive private information to be very precise relative to public information, 
and therefore adjust their trading decisions more strongly towards the private part of information. 
Alternatively, they may mistrust their private information, for instance if it is compounded of different 
or even contradictory signals, but believe public information to be very precise. This might be due to 
the fact that the market sentiment has repeatedly been vindicated by the economic development in the 
past. In that case, each trader would place more emphasis on the public part of his information. Each 
trader’s posterior expectation with regard to economic fundamentals therefore constitutes a weighted 
average of his private and public information with the weights given by the relative precision of the 
respective information type. If the market is very pessimistic concerning the fundamental 
development, i.e. if the mean of public information is rather low (or ‘bad’), and traders put more 
weight on this public information when it carries the higher precision, the whole market gets more 
aggressive. This impact of public information is strengthened by the fact that each trader knows that 
all of them succumb to this line of reasoning. As such, crises are still self-fulfilling. If, instead, private 
information is very precise in this instance, this might induce the individual trader to disregard the 
content of public information and abstain from attacking, provided that his or her individual 
interpretation of the economic development is sufficiently optimistic, i.e. his private information is 
high (or ‘good’). Exactly the opposite holds if the market is optimistic in general. 
 
What can be learnt from these models for the optimal design of information dissemination by policy 
makers and financial authorities? Taking the case of a pessimistic market as the more serious 
background for speculation against the price of an asset, providing information publicly increases the 
aggressiveness of traders the more precise this information is. In case of an optimistic market, instead, 
making public utterances with high precision should be beneficial to prevent speculative action. It 
stands to reason, however, whether the authorities are also able to disclose information privately. If 
they are, the precision of private information should be highest in pessimistic markets and lowest in 
optimistic markets. But can public authorities really influence private information? For public 
information to coordinate behaviour by acting as a focal point for beliefs, the content of this 
information has to be common knowledge. This poses very strong requirements on the visibility and 
comprehensibility of the announcements to the market, so that it might be argued that even though 
information is disseminated by the public sector to the whole market, the content of this information 
does not necessarily have to become public information in the sense defined in the literature. Even if 
one does not want to align with this reasoning, it might be argued that the information disseminating 
institutions might try to disperse the individual interpretations of the market participants, thereby 
making private information less precise. Hence, information disclosures by the authorities might lead 
to both private and public information being generated on the markets. Policy advice regarding the 
dissemination of information through public authorities therefore becomes even more complex. The 
question remains whether possibly one of the two types of information dominates the other, so that 
clearer advice may be given with regard to an optimal information setting for financial markets. 
 
The results presented so far have been derived from theoretical work solely. Only recently have 
studies begun to ask for empirical underpinnings of the role of information in financial markets. In 
particular, it may be interesting to know what kind of uncertainty drives the markets. Is it possible to 
differentiate between behavioural and fundamental uncertainty at all? In which way are they   7
influenced by private and public information? Most importantly, what is the result of aggregated 
behaviour on financial markets due to private and public information? In general there are two ways to 
try to answer these questions. Either traders’ behaviour is examined individually, for instance in a 
laboratory situation, or aggregated behaviour is looked at by taking data from the whole market. 
Accordingly, two strands of literature appeared in the last few months that concentrated on either 
experimental or econometric tools to test for the influence of private and public information on 
financial markets. 
 
Recent experimental studies on the influence of information on coordination decisions have been 
conducted by Heinemann et al. (2002) and Cabrales et al. (2002). Whereas the latter focused on the 
question which equilibrium prevails if agents possess either private or public information, Heinemann 
et al. (2002) additionally compared the individual impact of private information on the one hand and 
public information on the other hand on the decision making process. Their experiment is structured as 
to resemble a currency crisis situation without giving reference to this particular example in the 
explanation to the participating subjects. Subjects had to choose on either a safe action or a risky 
action. The risky action delivered a positive payoff whenever the number of agents deciding on this 
action was higher than an exogenously given hurdle. The payoff to the risky action was positively 
linked to the underlying fundamental state. In the ‘public’ setting of the experiment, subjects were 
informed about the fundamental state and knew that this was common knowledge. In the ‘private’ 
setting, subjects individually received private signals about the fundamental state while sharing 
knowledge about the random process generating the private signals. As a preliminary result, 
Heinemann et al. (2002) showed that players behaved rather similarly in situations with private and 
public information. In particular, the subjects’ decisions were consistent with threshold strategies in 
both settings, i.e. the risky action was chosen only if the observed signals, respectively the observed 
fundamental state, exceeded a certain threshold value. Even though this seems to be an intuitive result, 
theory predicts the employment of threshold strategies only for an infinitely large number of levels on 
beliefs over beliefs (Nagel, 1995). This result can therefore be taken as a first indication that public 
information is more easily generated than might have been believed. Furthermore, the authors were 
able to show that the set of states in which subjects coordinated on the risky action was larger under 
public information than under private information. They concluded that public information not only 
makes coordination among players easier, but it also increases their trust in the strength of a group 
decision, thereby reducing behavioural uncertainty. Converted to the currency crisis example, their 
result implies that with public information on economic and financial fundamentals traders will 
coordinate on a speculative attack for fundamental states in which they would refrain from attacking if 
information were purely private. Hence, according to the experiment, a central bank should have a 
clear overall incentive “to withhold information and leave traders to rely on less precise outside 
information” (Heinemann, 2002).  
 
Two recent empirical studies (Prati and Sbracia, 2002; Metz, 2003b) on the influence of information in 
financial markets focus on the 1997-98 Asian crisis and the Mexican Peso crisis in 1994-95, 
respectively. In particular, monetary policy in Mexico in the months before the crisis in December 
1994 has been characterised as very intransparent, since the Mexican central bank did not disclose any 
data on monetary aggregates for most of the year 1994. The 1997-98 Asian crisis also proves to be a 
useful example of information driving financial markets because of the many diverging beliefs held 
over the various Asian countries in the run-up to the crisis. The testable hypotheses in both papers, 
based on Metz (2002, 2003a), question whether the uncertainty among market participants before and   8
during the crises significantly influenced the speculative pressure on the fixed parities and if this 
impact was contingent on both the market sentiment and on the type of information dominating the 
market, i.e. either private or public information. Both studies come to an insightful result: the currency 
crises in Asia and Latin America have been driven largely by public rather than private information 
about the economic and financial development.  
 
Data on traders’ information at the time of the respective crises in both studies have been taken from 
Consensus Economics. The data sets delivered by Consensus Economics contain one-year forecasts of 
various economic variables collected from different forecasting research agencies, banks, and other 
financial institutions. The market sentiment defined in the theoretical models is mirrored by the mean 
of forecasts with regard to each variable. The market is interpreted as optimistic, if the mean of 
forecasts is higher than a threshold representing the actual realization of the fundamental variable for 
the respective time period, and pessimistic if it is lower. Uncertainty is measured by the standard 
deviation of forecasts and is interpreted as the inverse of the precision of information. The exchange 
rate pressure index is estimated as the sum of the normalized monthly depreciation of the respective 
currencies against the US$, the normalized fall in international reserves and the normalized short-term 
interest rate. In both the Asian and the Mexican crisis, the index of exchange rate pressure spiked at 
the onset of the crisis and decreased afterwards. The study by Prati and Sbracia finds that only 
forecasts with regard to GDP-growth have significantly influenced traders’ behaviour. Since the sign 
of uncertainty in GDP-growth forecasts is positive, Prati and Sbracia conclude that it was largely 
public information that influenced speculative behaviour. In particular at the onset of the Asian crisis 
expectations about economic fundamentals were still good but uncertainty was increasing. Taking this 
uncertainty as being driven by public information, it follows from the theoretical model that the 
market became more aggressive and exchange rate pressure therefore increased.  
 
The study by Metz (2003b) contains forecasts of both GDP-growth and of foreign exchange reserves. 
Since the Mexican central bank did not disclose any data on its international reserves between April 
and October 1994, one might be inclined to believe uncertainties about this variable to be individual 
and therefore private rather than public. The econometric analysis, however, comes to the result that 
uncertainties both with regard to GDP-growth and to foreign exchange reserves were driven by public 
information and increased the speculative pressure on the fixed Peso parity. The interpretation of the 
impact of these uncertainties is rather contrary, though. Comparing the expected and the actual 
development of fundamentals, it is found that in the months leading up to the Peso crisis the market 
was overly pessimistic with regard to GDP-growth but very optimistic concerning the development of 
international currency reserves. At the same time, uncertainties in the forecasts of the former variable 
were decreasing, while the disparities in reserves forecasts were increasing. Had the central bank’s 
deliberately chosen policy of not disclosing any data on monetary aggregates resulted in individual, 
private expectations being formed by traders, the increasing uncertainty would have reduced 
speculative pressure in the still optimistic market. Obviously, however, the central bank’s information 
policy was interpreted similarly by all market participants. They all knew that the central bank tried to 
hide the actual development of reserves and this quickly became common knowledge. Combined with 
the fact that the true value of international reserves was still not known, the dispersion of forecasts was 
a sign of public rather than private information being imprecise. This strongly increased speculative 
pressure, even though the market in general was still optimistic with regard to the development of 
currency reserves. For the expectations concerning GDP-growth, the opposite held. Since the market 
was timely informed about the data on actual GDP development by the authorities, uncertainties   9
decreased and this, in an already rather pessimistic market concerning the real development of the 
economy, made speculators even more aggressive.  
 
Both empirical studies therefore conclude that it is public rather than private information that moves 
the markets. An additional regression on the Mexican data, covering the interval 1993-2000, supports 
this statement by including even more forecast data. The regression equation follows Metz (2003b): 
 
01 2 3 4 5 6 7
ff f f f f f ERP GDP mean GDP uncert RES mean RES uncert BB mean BB uncert CA mean γγ γ γ γ γ γ γ =+ + + + + + +  
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As can be seen from the following table, almost each of the uncertainty variables turns out to have a 
positive coefficient, which is a sign of public information fuelling the uncertainty.
2 Obviously, public 
information fuelled the uncertainty among traders for an even larger set of economic variables than 
indicated by the recent empirical models.
3 
 
 
Tab.2: 
Variable Coefficient  Standard  Error 
Constant 4,3124***  1,0498 
GDP forecast mean   -1,0526***  0,3717 
GDP forecast uncertainty  0,5271*  0,3451 
Reserves forecast mean  -1,3182***  0,2302 
Reserves forecast uncertainty  0,7447***  0,0946 
Budgetbalance forecast mean  0,405  0,5592 
Budgetbalance forecast uncertainty  3,997*  2,3165 
Current account forecast mean  0,0301  0,0197 
Current account forecast uncertainty  -0,0009  0,0008 
Exchange rate (lagged)  0,1737**  0,0685 
R-squared 
DW-Statistic 
F-Statistic 
Prob(F-Statistic) 
0,749 
2,1971 
11,9341 
0,0000 
***, **, * significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent 
 
 
Even though strong theoretical requirements on the order of beliefs cast doubt on the efficacy of public 
information steering the behaviour of financial market participants, both experimental and empirical 
                                                 
2 The uncertainty variables are constructed by multiplying the standard deviation of the forecasts in each period 
with an index measuring whether the market is optimistic or pessimistic compared to the actual development of 
the respective variable. An overly optimistic market results in a positive sign of the uncertainty variable. If in 
such a case increasing uncertainty raises the exchange rate pressure (i.e. the coefficient is positive), the 
theoretical model attributes this to public information being the source of uncertainty. In an overly pessimistic 
market, the index measuring optimism versus pessimism has a negative sign. Whenever the coefficient of the 
uncertainty variable then turns out to be positive, again it should have been imprecise public information driving 
the uncertainty, thereby decreasing speculative pressure. 
3 The displayed regression does not, however, emphasize the test of a negative influence of the forecasts’ mean, 
as compared to the studies by Prati and Sbracia (2002) and Metz (2003b).   10
studies promote the dominance of public information over private. Obviously, publicly delivered 
fundamental information succeeds in resolving behavioural uncertainty, thereby rendering traders 
much more optimistic towards the success of coordinated actions. At the same time, however, the 
direction in which traders’ actions are influenced by information disclosures depends on the market 
sentiment. Public information therefore not necessarily renders markets more aggressive or unstable. 
What can be learned from these results? Obviously, it would be wrong for policy makers to conclude 
that in situations of financial turmoil the ‘best’ information is ‘no’ information. Clearly, such a policy 
would be aimed at hiding a deteriorating fundamental development in order not to make traders too 
aggressive. However, this policy measure only accounts for the role of delivering, respectively 
withholding, informational content, while ignoring the coordination role of information. If the lack of 
information is interpreted publicly while the market in general is still optimistic, as has been the case 
in Mexico in 1994 with regard to the monetary development, the withholding of information might 
even be the very trigger of a full-blown financial crisis. Optimal information policy therefore very 
carefully has to take into account the interplay of market sentiment and the actual development of 
fundamentals, thereby acting discretionary rather than always being fully transparent as has often been 
claimed as optimal. Since public utterances by the information providing authorities seem to become 
public information rather than being interpreted individually, only an overly pessimistic market 
sentiment should be accompanied by intransparent, i.e. imprecise, information disclosures. In contrast, 
an over-optimistic market should be strengthened by a dissemination of fully transparent information.      
 
 
 
 
   11
 
References: 
 
Bhattacharya, Utpal and Matthew Spiegel. 1991. “Insiders, Outsiders, and Market Breakdowns.” 
The Review of Financial Studies. 4:2, pp. 255-282. 
 
Cabrales, Antonio, Rosemarie Nagel and Roc Armenter. 2002. “Equilibrium Selection through 
Incomplete Information in Coordination Games: An Experimental Study.” Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 
Departament d'Economia i Impresa. Working Paper Ref. 601. 
 
Glosten, Lawrence and  Paul Milgrom. 1985. “Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist 
Market with Heterogenously Informed Traders.” Journal of Financial Economics. 14, pp. 21-142. 
 
Heinemann, Frank and Gerhard Illing. 2002. “Speculative Attacks: Unique Equilibrium and 
Transparency.” Journal of International Economics. 58, pp. 429-450. 
 
Heinemann, Frank and Christina E. Metz. 2002. “Optimal Risk Taking and Information Policy to 
Avoid Currency and Liquidity Crises.” University of Kassel Discussion Paper. 31/02. 
 
Heinemann, Frank. 2002. “Exchange-Rate Attack as a Coordination Game: Theory and 
Experimental Evidence.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 18:4, pp. 462-478. 
 
Heinemann, Frank, Rosemarie Nagel and Peter Ockenfels. 2002. „Speculative Attack and 
Financial Architecture: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private 
Information.“ London School of Economics, Financial Markets Group Working Paper dp416. 
 
Hellwig, Christian. 2002. “Public Information, Private Information, and the Multiplicity of Equilibria 
in Coordination Games.” Journal of Economic Theory. December, 107, pp. 191-222. 
 
Hirshleifer, Jack and John G. Riley. 1992. The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Holden, C. and  A. Subrahmanyam. 1992. “Long-lived Private Information and Imperfect 
Competition.” Journal of Finance. 47, pp. 247-270. 
 
International Monetary Fund. 1998. Report of the Managing Director to the Interim Committee on 
Strengthening the Architecture of the International Monetary System. 
http://www.imf.org./external/np/omd/100198.htm. 
 
Kyle, Albert. 1985. “Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading.” Econometrica. November, 53:6, pp. 
1315-36. 
 
Metz, Christina E. 2002. “Private and Public Information in Self-Fulfilling Currency Crises.” Journal 
of Economics. 76:1, pp. 65-85. 
   12
Metz, Christina E. 2003a. Information Dissemination in Currency Crises. Berlin Heidelberg New 
York: Springer. 
 
Metz, Christina E. 2003b. “The Role of Information Disparity in the 1994/95 Mexican Peso Crisis: 
Empirical Evidence.” Mimeo. 
 
Morris, Stephen and Hyun Song Shin. 1998. “Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling 
Currency Attacks.” American Economic Review. 88, pp. 587-597. 
 
Morris, Stephen and Hyun Song Shin. 2001. "Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt." European 
Economic Review. Forthcoming. 
 
Morris, Stephen and Hyun Song Shin. 2002a. “Social Value of Public Information.” American 
Economic Review. December, 2:5, pp. 1521-34. 
 
Morris, Stephen and  Hyun Song Shin. 2002b. “Global Games: Theory and Applications,” in 
Advances in Economics and Econometrics, the Eighth World Congress. M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen 
and S. Turnovsky, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Nagel, Rosemarie. 1995. “Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study.” American 
Economic Review. 85:5, pp. 1313-26. 
 
Obstfeld, Maurice. 1994. “The Logic of Currency Crises.” Cahiers Economiques et Monetaires. 43, 
pp. 189-213. 
 
Obstfeld, Maurice. 1996. “Models of Currency Crises with Self-Fulfilling Features.” European 
Economic Review. 40, pp. 1037-47. 
 
Prati, Alessandro and Massimo Sbracia. 2002. “Currency Crises and Uncertainty About 
Fundamentals.” IMF Working Paper. 02/3. 
 
Sbracia, Massimo and Andrea Zaghini. 2001. “Expectation and Information in Second Generation 
Currency Crises Models.” Economic Modelling. 18, pp. 203-222. CFS Working Paper Series: 
 
No.  Author(s)  Title 
2003/19  Karl-Hermann Fischer 
Christian Pfeil 
Regulation and Competition in German Banking: 
An Assessment 
2003/20  Ralf Elsas 
Jan Pieter Krahnen 
Universal Banks and Relationships with Firms 
2003/21  Günter Gebhardt 
Rolf Reichardt 
Carsten Wittenbrink 
Financial Instruments Fair Value Accounting for
(not against) the Banking Industry 
2003/22  Roman Kräussl  Do Changes in Sovereign Credit Ratings 
Contribute to Financial Contagion in Emerging 
Market Crises? 
2003/23  Roman Kräussl  A Critique on the Proposed Use of External 
Sovereign Credit Ratings in Basel II 
2003/24  Tereza Tykvová  Is the Behavior of German Venture Capitalists 
Different? Evidence from the Neuer Markt 
2003/25  Tereza Tykvová  The Role of the Value Added by the Venture 
Capitalists in Timing and Extent of IPOs 
2003/26  Stefanie Franzke 
Stefanie Grohs 
Christian Laux 
Initial Public Offerings and Venture Capital in 
Germany 
2003/27  Andreas Hackethal  German banks – a declining industry? 
2003/28  Frank A. Schmid 
Mark Wahrenburg 
Mergers and Acquisitions in Germany-Social 
Setting and Regulatory Framework 
2003/29  Christina E. Bannier  Privacy or Publicity – Who Drives the Wheel? 
 
 
Copies of working papers are available at the Center for Financial Studies or can be 
downloaded (http://www.ifk-cfs.de). 